Policies, policy-makers and financial flows: An empirical examination by Costa, Diogo Freitas Lopes Pereira da
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a 
Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics. 
 
 
 
Policies, Policy-makers and Financial Flows: An Empirical Examination 
Diogo Freitas Lopes Pereira da Costa, 
Student number 496 
 
 
 
A Project carried out on the Economics course, under the supervision of: 
Professor José Tavares 
 
 
7
th
 January 2013 
2 
 
Abstract  
This paper examines the response of international investors to country fiscal outcomes 
and the dynamics of this response according to the type of government that is in power. 
The issue is examined with a model that has been estimated using data from 22 OECD 
countries for the period of 1998 through 2008. International financial flows are highly 
heterogeneous and this paper finds different effects depending on the type of flow. The 
results of this paper suggest that an increase in government expenses increase the level 
of FDI and an increase in government revenues decrease the level of FDI. The evidence 
produced in the model also suggests that Majority governments have a negative impact 
on the level of the three types of capital flows.   
Introduction 
International capital flows have experienced an exponential growth in recent years
1
. 
This dramatic growth motivated several authors to examine the fundamentals of capital 
flows and consequently the existent literature on the theme is immense.  
This surge in capital flows is often attributed to the increased integration of world 
financial markets (Evans, 2005). In anticipation of the benefits of capital flows, many 
countries reduced their capital controls, which contributed to a fast financial integration.  
Financial innovation and development, the rapid growth of world trade, the elimination 
of intra-euro exchange risk, the attractiveness of several emerging economies and the 
cyclical factors (periods of low interest rates) are other important determinants for 
global financial integration. (OECD, 2011) 
                                                 
1
 Especially in the last two decades, capital flows increased significantly in terms of both size and 
volatility. The global gross flows have moved from an average of less than 5 percent of global GDP 
during 1980–99 to a peak of about 20 percent by 2007. (International Monetary Fund, 2012)  
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Appendixes A.1, A.2 and A.3 plot the evolution of FDI, capital account, and equity 
flows, respectively, the graphs show that the increasing role of these flows is evident. 
Two important aspects are here demonstrated, first, the tremendous growth in recent 
years and second, the high volatility.  
By analyzing the graphs of capital flows it is clear that both volatility and level of 
capital flows are much higher after the end of the 1980s, however these inflows have 
increased substantially throughout the whole sample period. 
FDI net flows (Appendix A.1) remained fairly stable until the end of the 1980s then, 
they started to increase slowly, with a huge increase and a very high volatility after the 
1990s. Capital account flows (Appendix A.2) increased throughout the whole sample, 
but especially after the 1980s, where there is a period of high volatility and large 
fluctuations in most countries.  
Regarding equity flows (Appendix A.3), Belgium and Ireland, have experienced huge 
net inflows of portfolio equity and should be treated as outliers. So in order to have a 
better comprehension, I present in appendix A.4. the evolution of equity flows without 
these two countries. Equity flows are much more volatile than the other two, with large 
fluctuations since 1960, however the conclusions are in accordance with the other two 
capital flows, experienced an increase throughout the whole sample but with higher 
volatility and growth especially after the 1980s. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the debate over the benefits of international 
capital mobility has been revived, and many authors have been focused on explaining 
the impacts of capital flows on economic performance. Researchers have used cross-
country analysis to study the connections between capital flows and essential 
macroeconomic variables. However, and despite the intensive discussion over the past 
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few years in academic circles, the conclusions about the economic benefits of global 
financial flows are not consensual, evidence on potential economic growth with 
integration on international capital markets is mixed (Kose, 2006). 
The existent literature suggests a number of different reasons and channels through 
which the integration of international capital markets can support countries to improve 
their long-term economic performance. The most powerful argument in favor of 
international capital mobility, voiced by, among others, Fischer, Summers, Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, is that it facilitates an efficient global allocation of savings by channeling 
financial resources to their most productive uses, thereby increasing economic growth 
and welfare. (Alfaro, 2006) 
Fischer (1997) describes the increase in capital flows as an opportunity to enhance 
stability among industrialized countries and concludes that the benefits of liberalizing 
the capital account outweigh the potential costs.  
For Summers, (2000) the financial system can contribute enormously to economic 
development around the world, and the flow of capital across international borders can 
confer large benefits.  
Obstfeld (1998) argues that “economic theory leaves no doubt about the potential 
advantages of global financial trading”. For the author, the existence of international 
financial markets allow countries to borrow to financially invest and consequently 
promoting economic growth, without an increase in the domestic savings rates. The 
capital markets also channel savings to the most productive uses and diversify risks. 
Obstfeld also noted that international capital markets are able to discipline 
policymakers. 
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Rogoff (2006) noted that a recent growing literature shows that financial openness can 
promote not only the development of the domestic financial sector but can also impose 
discipline on macroeconomic policies, generate efficiency gains among domestic firms 
by exposing them to competition from foreign entrants, and unleash forces that result in 
better government and corporate governance. 
In conclusion, financial integration allows economies to specialize in the production of 
goods for which they have a comparative advantage, either due to different factor 
endowments or different technologies, increased competition, facilitate the transfer of 
knowledge from technological leaders to technological laggards and let firms exploit 
increasing returns to scale both for current production and for technological 
development. (Rappaport, 2000) 
Despite the innumerous long term benefits here presented, financial integration can pose 
for countries some vulnerabilities and risks in the short term that should not be 
underestimated.  
The debate over the merits of international capital flows is a growing literature with 
many contributions. Some empirical work
2
 has not confirmed a robust and positive 
impact on international capital flows for economic growth. Some researchers
3
 claim that 
financial globalization costs can, under some circumstances, outweigh the benefits. The 
general arguments are that the increase of the capital flows creates higher risks of crises 
(particularly for developing countries), and creating incentives for excessive borrowing 
and is an obstacle for financial stability. 
                                                 
2
 See Kose et al. (2006) to an overview of the works developed over the merits of capital flows on 
economic growth 
3
 Prasad (2006) Milesi-Ferretti et al. (1995) Kraay (1998) and Edison et al. (2002) 
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Especially after the crises of the 1990s
4
, economists started to pay attention to the 
negative impacts of international capital flows. The recent financial crisis also provided 
a good example of the negative consequences of financial instability
5
 and underlined the 
challenges for policymakers.  
Capital flows are likely to remain an important feature of international financial markets 
and to remain highly volatile, therefore it is incumbent for policymakers to develop 
strategies to deal with risks of financial crises and to limit their destructive impact when 
they occur. 
As I have emphasized, the most serious concern for policymakers is the volatility of 
capital flows, as they can, by internal or external reasons to the recipient countries, 
abruptly slow and thus force a painful macroeconomic and financial adjustment (Gavin, 
1995). Policymakers have an important challenge to overcome, it is crucial for countries 
to mitigate the potential financial stability risks associated with large future 
international capital flows but, simultaneously, it is very important to try to retain the 
benefits that financial globalisation has to offer. (Speller, 2011) 
Several countries have dealt with the adverse effects of such vulnerability by taking 
measures to limit capital flows. (OECD, 2011). The appropriate macroeconomic and 
structural policies play a crucial role in limiting these vulnerabilities
6
. For policymakers 
to best response to the challenges of international capital flows, it is crucial to analyze 
and understand the key drivers of the financial flows.  
                                                 
4
 The economic crisis of Mexico in 1994, Asian financial crisis in 1997, Russian financial crisis in 1999 
and Argentine economic crisis 1999. 
5 For example, one of the most important precondition for the recent crisis was the build-up of global 
imbalances (large net capital flows) (Speller, 2011). 
6
 For example, bad macroeconomic policies (i.e. higher government consumption or high volatility of 
inflation) are associated with higher volatility in capital flows (Alfaro, 2006). 
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John Alquist (2006) argues that investors allocate their investments according to the 
policies they observe, and if policies are not those they prefer, they reallocate their 
funds in response. Since default is a serious concern for investors, countries that present 
more fragile macroeconomic conditions will be more susceptible to the volatility of 
international markets. In this way, the response of international investors to fiscal policy 
signals and outcomes is crucial for the stability of the financial system. 
In the context of the present financial crisis, one of the major challenges for OECD 
countries is fiscal consolidation, as fiscal policy is not sustainable and countries need 
with urgency to reduce the large public deficits and debts that they have accumulated 
over the past years.  
This paper examines the impact of fiscal policy outcomes on the level of the three types 
of international capital flows for 22 OECD countries
7
 for the period of 1998 to 2008. 
The objective of this study is to assess the impact on capital flows from changes in the 
fiscal variables and additionally, determine the reaction of international investors 
according to the type of cabinet system in power.  
The focus of this paper is to assess two major questions: first, do the fiscal policy 
outcome affect the allocation of international capital flows? And second, how do 
international investors respond to the same fiscal policy undertaken by different actors?  
The first of the questions is useful to examine the role of fiscal policy over international 
capital flows – if fluctuations over capital flows could be explained by changes in 
government expenses or revenues. The second question allows to measure the relevance 
                                                 
7 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, New Zealand and 
Canada 
 
8 
 
of government ideology based on the reaction of international investors – if capital 
flows respond differently according to the type of cabinet system that is in power. 
Data and Summary Statistics 
The data relies on two main different sources, the OECD Economic Outlook No 86 - 
December 2009 and World Development Indicators form World Bank.  
Although I have data available from 1960, the regressions of the model will be for the 
period after 1998, because the data available for fiscal and control variables are more 
consistent and reliable after that period, and also because, as I mentioned in the last 
section, it is the period where volatility and level of capital flows were higher.  
Appendix B presents a description of the variables, grouped in categories. The 
international capital flows were divided in: foreign direct investment, equity flows and 
capital account and the data was collected from the World Development Indicators.  
As previously referred to,  the existent literature on the determinants of capital flows is 
immense. Based on that literature, I used three control variables: GDP per capita, 
inflation and real growth rate of GDP per capita. The variables are detailed in Appendix 
B and were also collected from the World Development Indicators.  
The political variables data were also collected from the World Development Indicators 
and fiscal variables data is from the OECD Economic Outlook No 86 - December 2009, 
both are detailed in Appendix B.  
Although this analysis is focused on the period after 1998, I present in Appendix C.1 
summary statistics for the different variables from 1960 to 2008 and in Appendix C.2 
the summary statistics for the period of regression analysis (after 1998). All the three 
types of capital flows (FDI, equity and capital account) are expressed in percentage of 
GDP. As expected, by comparing the two different tables, the volatility and level of 
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capital flows
8
 are higher in the more recent years. Comparing the control variables 
between the two periods,  it is observable that the real per capita growth and inflation 
were lower in the 1998-2008 period. 
Regarding the political variables, the usual government is from a Right ideology, 
Majority system and in a Coalition.  
Fiscal variables values are not very different from the two sub-periods, both expenses 
and revenues are, on average, moderately higher in the second period, but the budget 
deficits are, on average, lower.   
Finally, regarding the interaction
9
 of the fiscal variables with the cabinet ideology, 
Right-wing governments, in general, have lower revenues and lower expenditures, 
however they run higher deficits than the Left-wing governments and Majority and 
Single Party governments also run higher deficits than minorities or Coalitions 
Model 
The first model of the analysis assess the reactions of all three types of capital flows to 
the three control variables and two fiscal variables, by running cross-country 
regressions for the period 1998-2008. The model can be expressed by: 
                                                        
Where      represent a specific capital flow ( FDI net, equity flows in and capital 
account) divided by nominal GDP, for country   in period   . The variables          and 
     represent, respectively, CPI inflation, real per capita GDP growth and GDP per 
                                                 
8
 Using Appendix C.1 and C.2 and by looking to the standard deviation and mean of the three type of 
capital flows we can see that both present higher values for the period of 1998-2008. 
9
 The interaction between the variables is calculated by the multiplication of the dummy variable 
regarding the ideology of cabinet system and the level of revenue or expense in the same period. 
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capita , for country   in period   . The variables            and            represent 
respectively, the government revenues and expenditures for country   in period   . 
I measure the economic development of an economy as the real GDP per capita, the 
national economic performance as yearly growth in real GDP per capita and I also take 
into consideration the role of inflation on the fluctuations of capital flows. The control 
variables are present to ensure that the relationship between government expenditures 
and revenues and capital flows is not determined by the better economic performance of 
some countries. The three different capital flows are heterogeneous and therefore it is 
not expected that the significance of control variables should be equal in the three types 
of capital flows. 
It is not included in the model an extensive set of control variables since the main 
objective is not to find determinants of capital flows but rather to assess if investors 
react and how they react to different fiscal outcomes. Furthermore, I will also evaluate if 
this reaction is different according to the type of government in power. 
In order to assess the reaction of investor with the different type of cabinet system in 
power  I build a second model where I include the interactions of the fiscal variables 
with the cabinet system data and the type of cabinet; a model with all sets of variables. 
The idea is to create a framework to compare the reaction of international investors to 
the fiscal policy variables for the different type of capital flows, and distinguish between 
the effects of fiscal performance on capital flows depending the type of cabinet system 
in power. Regarding what was explained, the model is: 
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  Where      represent a specific capital flow (FDI net, equity flows in and capital 
account) divided by nominal GDP, for country   in period   . The variables          and 
     represent, respectively, CPI inflation, real per capita GDP growth and GDP per 
capita , for country   in period   . The rest of the model is composed by fiscal variables 
(expenses and revenues), political variables (Right, Left, Majority and Coalition) and 
interaction between the two (Right/Left expenses, Right/Left revenues, Majority 
expenses/revenues and Coalition expenses/revenues). 
As previously referred to, one of the main characteristics of international capital flows is 
that they are very heterogeneous and I expect different conclusions from each type of 
flow.  
I expect GDP per capita to be correlated with three different type of flows since it is one 
of the most accepted control variable in the literature. In general, net flows of FDI are 
negative for more developed countries and positive for less developed, which means 
that lower GDP per capita values imply higher levels of FDI (negative correlation). I 
suspect that capital account also presents a negative relationship with GDP per capita,  
but on the other hand equity flows are likely to be positively correlated with the 
development of a country, more developed countries should receive more equity flows 
than less developed.  
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Regarding inflation and real per capita GDP growth, I expect them to be correlated with 
capital account and equity flows. These two are the most volatile type of flows and 
since they also have shorter time horizons than FDI, it is expectable that investors 
decisions react more to any source of economic instability. In particular higher 
economic growth is associated with larger international capital flows. 
In the next section, I will present and analyze the results of the model both by fixed 
effects and linear regression. 
Results 
Table 1 presents the results of the first model estimation with robust standard errors. 
Hausman tests results indicates that the best methodology to be used is fixed effects 
regression, I choose to focus the analysis on this method given that they always produce 
consistent estimators, even when not the most efficient. This method control for the 
stable characteristics of  individual and therefore eliminates potentially sources of 
bias
10
. However I also present the results under linear regression. 
Fixed effects regression results seem to capture better the effects of fiscal policy on the 
change of capital flows, especially concerning government expenses. In the fixed effects 
regressions, all three types of flows respond significantly to the change on government 
expenses. To an increase in government spending, capital account and equity flows 
respond negatively with a decrease in flows, but on the other hand, foreign direct 
investment respond positively to an increase in expenditures with an increase in flows. 
                                                 
10
 The signs under fixed effects and linear regression persist for the Majority of the cases, the only 
difference between the two methods is on the significance of some variables.  
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Government revenues are not significant to any type of financial flow, neither trough 
linear regression or fixed effects. 
Regarding the three control variables, under the fixed effects regression inflation is 
relevant for FDI and GDP per capita is significant for capital account and for equity 
flows.  
In the linear regression model, GDP per capita is relevant in explaining FDI and capital 
account. Inflation is also significant for capital account flows and the only determinant 
of equity flows is real per capita GDP growth. The real per capita GDP growth have a 
significant and positive impact on equity flows, countries with higher growth rate have 
higher inflow of equity flows. 
Table 1 - Explaining the fiscal variables impact on capital flows, 1998 -2008 
Dependent 
Variable 
FDI 
Capital 
account 
Equity FDI 
Capital 
Account 
Equity 
 
Linear Regression Fixed Effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inflation (CPI) 
0.169 
(0.594) 
0.091*** 
(0.025) 
0.492 
(0.534) 
0.535** 
(0.224) 
0.032 
(0.027) 
0.506 
(0.542) 
Real per capita 
GDP growth 
-0.001 
(0.219) 
0.007 
(0.018) 
1.206*** 
(0.423) 
0.295 
(0.206) 
0.007 
(0.017) 
0.1007 
(0.226) 
GDP per capita 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
Expenses 
0.054 
(0.172) 
-0.003 
(0.114) 
-0.270* 
(0.164) 
0.524** 
(0.210) 
-0.025* 
(0.014) 
-0.737** 
(0.321) 
Revenues 
(-0.018) 
(0.130) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.115 
(0.138) 
-0.278 
(0.234) 
0.001 
(0.014) 
0.3618 
(0.232) 
No. Observations 255 255 256 255 255 256 
Notes: Robust standard errors are here presented in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% level ** Significant 
at 5% level *** Significant at 1% level.  
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The second model of our analysis is presented in Table 2, using, again, OLS estimation 
with robust standard errors and fixed effects estimation with robust standard errors.   
Notes: Robust standard errors are here presented in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% level ** Significant 
at 5% level *** Significant at 1% level.  
The analysis starts considering FDI as the dependent variable. Table 2 (4) plots the OLS 
estimation of FDI net flows between 1998 and 2008 under fixed effects. As theory 
predicts, the initial level of development is determinant for FDI, the initial GDP per 
Table 2 - Explaining the fiscal variables, political and interaction variables impact on 
capital flows, 1998 -2008 
Dependent 
Variable 
FDI 
Capital 
account 
Equity FDI 
Capital 
account 
Equity 
 
Linear Regression Fixed Effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inflation (CPI) 
0.417 
(0.298) 
0.1076***  
(0.024) 
1.834** 
(0 .794) 
0.8862 
(0.679) 
-0.0110 
(0.0263) 
1.1039   
(0.7124) 
Real per capita 
GDP growth 
0.007 
(0.277) 
0.0466*   
(0.0241) 
2.169***   
(0.539) 
0.2731 
(0.479) 
0.0109 
(0.0212) 
0.7411**   
(0.3315) 
GDP per capita 
-0.132***   
(0.0329) 
-0.021***   
(0.0037) 
0.029 
 (0.0769) 
-0.163** 
(0 .0615) 
-0.0095** 
(0.0035) 
-0.226**    
(0.0839) 
Expenses 
1.384*** 
(0.391) 
0.0127   
(0.027) 
-0.9296   
(0.855) 
1.814*** 
(0.411) 
0.0194 
(0.0205) 
-0.5854   
(0.3737) 
Right Expenses 
-1.511*** 
(0.3667) 
0.0213   
(0.021) 
-0.243   
(0.845) 
-1.470*** 
(0.3466) 
-0.0341** 
(0.0139) 
-0.3499   
(0.4993) 
Left Expenses 
-1.508***   
(0.3697) 
-0.0029   
(0.022) 
0.9186  
(0.868) 
-1.667*** 
(0.3882) 
-0.0546** 
(0.0197) 
-0.1904   
(0.3624) 
Majority 
Expenses 
0.583** 
(0.231) 
0.0421**   
(0.019) 
0.898*   
(0.5097) 
0.7173* 
(0.3591) 
0.0359*  
(0.0193) 
0.3876   
(0.2851) 
Coalition 
Expenses 
-0.377** 
(0.166) 
-0.0744***   
0.022) 
-0.297   
(0.3515) 
-0.689*** 
(0.3610) 
-0.0396* 
(0.0224) 
-0.7286   
(0.4556) 
Revenues 
-1.345*** 
(0.3604) 
-0.015  
 (0.026) 
1.067  
  (0.743) 
-2.099*** 
(0.5887) 
-0.0191 
(0.0308) 
0.6664*   
(0.3503) 
Right Revenues 
1.225***  
(0.3502) 
-0.0234   
(0.023) 
-0.898   
(0.0739) 
1.438*** 
(0.3667) 
0.0105 
(0.017) 
-0.2711   
(0.2770) 
Left Revenues 
1.551***   
(0.3512) 
-0.0149   
(0.024) 
-1.076  
 (0.761) 
1.674*** 
(0.3975) 
0.0176 
(0.016) 
-0.3858   
(0.2506) 
Majority 
Revenues 
-0.369***   
(0.1409) 
-0.0147 
 (0.01) 
0.008    
(0.270) 
-0.1799 
(0.2108) 
0.0018 
(0.009) 
-0.0001   
(0.3129) 
Coalition 
Revenues 
0.3767***   
(0.1383) 
0.0754***   
(0.019) 
-0.238   
(0.3087) 
0.2636 
(0.2032) 
0.0108  
 (0.009) 
0.4195   
(0.2484) 
Right Mode 
11.12 
(7.134) 
0.4189   
(0.629) 
55.42***  
(13.687) 
-0.1989 
(9.945) 
1.098** 
(0.5236) 
30.830**   
(13.069) 
Left Mode 
-3.7931 
(7.876) 
1.098     
(0.704) 
9.050   
(11.1539) 
-1.6211 
0.19 
1.679*   
(0.8249) 
26.933***   
(12.971) 
Majority Mode 
-11.72 * 
(6.585) 
-1.194**   
(0.468) 
-42.735**   
(18.179) 
-23.59** 
(9.584) 
-1.673**   
(.6860) 
-17.014**   
(7.2896) 
Coalition Mode 
0.9763 
(5.292) 
-0.324  
(0.562) 
29.067***   
(9.1465) 
19.59 
(11.81) 
1.407 
(1.025) 
13.973 
(15.643) 
No. Observations 235 235 236 235 235 236 
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capital level is negatively correlated and significant with a 1% level of significance. 
Meaning that, a more developed country is, on average, a lower recipient of FDI flows 
than a less developed country. The inflation level and real per capita GDP growth 
appear to have no significance on explaining the level FDI net flows.  
The coefficient on the variables Expenses and Revenues in Table 2 estimate the effect 
of an increase in each of these variables by a cabinet that is ideologically Center, 
controls a Minority in parliament, and is made up of a Single Party – that is, displays the 
political characteristics that are not explicitly interacted with the fiscal variables. In 
Table 3 below we want to compute how different political characteristics affect the 
marginal effect of fiscal changes on flows.  
Notes: In parenthesis it is the F-Statistic * Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level *** 
Significant at 1% level.  
Table 3 - Significance of interaction variables  
Dependent Variable FDI Capital Account Equity flows 
Expenses 
1.814 
(19.45)*** 
0.0194 
(0.90) 
-0.5854 
(2.45) 
Right expenses 
0.344 
 (0.74) 
-0.0147 
(0.88) 
-0.9353 
(5.05)** 
Left expenses 
0.147 
0.23 
-0.0352  
(3.70)** 
-0.7758 
(11.02)*** 
Majority expenses 
2.5313 
(29.97)*** 
0.0553 
(6.10)** 
-0.1978 
(0.30) 
Coalition expenses 
1.125 
(5.61)** 
-0.0202 
(0.84) 
-1.314 
14.65*** 
Revenues 
-2.099 
(3.00)*** 
0.0003 
(0.38) 
0.6664 
(3.62) 
Right revenues 
-0.661 
(0.1835) 
0.0299 
(0.21) 
0.3953 
(3.62)* 
Left revenues 
-0.425 
(1.89) 
-0.0015 
(0.00) 
0.2806 
(0.87) 
Majority revenues 
-2.2789 
(12.54)*** 
-0.0173 
(0.37) 
0.6663 
(2.67) 
Coalition revenues 
-1.8354 
(9.79)*** 
-0.0083 
(0.07) 
1.0859 
(8.72)*** 
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Government expenses is positively and significantly correlated with FDI flows. The 
tests show that this positive effect of government expenses on FDI flows is not 
independent of the ideological bent of the cabinet. In case of a Center government the 
results are significant and positive correlated, but the effects of a Right or Left wing 
cabinet are not significant
11
.  
Majority and Coalition governments expenditure are statistically significant for FDI, an 
increase in the level of expenditures by this type of governments has a positive effect, 
and increase the level of FDI to the host country.  
Concerning government revenues, an increase in revenues is negatively correlated with 
the level of FDI, but, again, the response is null for Right and Left wing cabinets, and 
statistically significant only in the case of Center cabinets. Majority and Coalition 
government have statistical significance, an increase in revenues undertaken by this type 
of cabinet having a negative impact on level terms for FDI.  
The type of cabinet has few relevance for FDI
12
, the only significant variable is 
Majority governments and only at a 10% significance level. FDI flows react negatively 
to a Majority government and consequently there is a reduction in the level of flows. 
Table 2 (5) replicates our baseline model to the capital account flows. The only control 
variable with significant impact on capital account flows is GDP per capita. I find 
evidence for a negative relation the initial level of GDP per capita and capital flows. 
Higher level of development induces lower level of flows - a more developed country 
is, on average, a lower recipient of capital account flows. 
                                                 
11
 By analyzing the table 3 where I compute the significance test for the Right Expenses ( Right_expenses 
+ Expenses = 0 ) and Left Expenses (Left_expenses + Expenses = 0), in both cases I do not reject the null 
hypothesis. 
12
 The results are present in Table 2  
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Regarding fiscal variables, the results reveal that there is not a very significant impact of 
these variables on capital account flows. The relation with government expenditures is 
only significant for Left and Majority governments, all the other interaction variables 
appear to be not statistically significant. Left governments increase in expenditures 
reduce the level of capital account flows and Majority governments increase in 
expenditures increase the level of capital account flows. Regarding government 
revenues, there is not any statistical significant variable. 
Concerning the type of cabinet in power
13
, a Majority cabinet has a negative effect on 
this type of flows, foreign investors tend to decrease the level of flows when the 
government in power is a Majority. There are also results dependent on the ideology of 
the cabinet system, Right and Left wing governments have a statistical significant and 
positive impact on attracting capital account flows.   
The third dependent variable is equity flows, the most volatile flow
14
. Real per capita 
GDP growth and the GDP per capita produces a statistically significant impact on 
explaining equity flows. Again, a more developed country receive, on average less 
equity flows, and real per capita GDP growth is positively related - an increase in the 
growth rate increase the level of flows.  
Concerning the results on fiscal variables, equity flows respond significantly to an 
increase in expenses by a Right or Left government, but not for a Center government. 
Additionally, a Right government also produces effects when they increase revenues. A 
Coalition government produces effects, both by increasing expenses or revenues, equity 
flows decrease with an increase in expenses and increase with an increase in revenues.  
                                                 
13
 The results are present in Table 2 
14
 Recall Appendix A and C for the evolution and summary statistics of this flow.  
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Equity flows have similar results to Capital account regarding the cabinet system. There 
is a positive correlation between both Right and Left wing governments, meaning this 
governments are more likely to receive equity flows than a Center wing government and 
there is a negative and significant impact of Majority governments
15
, meaning that 
capital flows respond with a decrease in level terms when the government is a Majority. 
Conclusions 
International capital flows have increased dramatically over the past recent years and 
this growth motivated several authors to explore the fundamentals of capital flows in 
more depth. A huge piece of literature was developed on the topic and despite the 
conclusions about the merits of capital flows are not consensual, financial integration is 
associated with better economic performance.  
The volatility of capital flows pose several challenges for policymakers, it is incumbent 
for policymakers to deal with the risks of financial crises and limit their destructive 
impact when they occur, but on the other hand is also very important that they can retain 
the large benefits that financial globalisation has to offer.  
The allocation of international investments is highly associated with the macroeconomic 
policies observed, and therefore countries with fragile economic positions are more 
susceptible to suffer from an abrupt reduce on capital flows which will implicate an a 
painful macroeconomic adjustment. In a context of a financial crisis and consequently, 
several fiscal adjustments, the dynamics of fiscal policy with capital flows is a serious 
concern of policymakers. 
                                                 
15
 The result is consistent with the other two type of flows where I find negative and significant 
correlation between the capital flow and a Majority government.   
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This paper examines the impact of fiscal policy outcomes in the level of three type of 
flows for 22 OECD countries for the period of 1998 to 2008. The two major objectives 
of this paper are to analyze empirically the role of fiscal policy over the level of 
international capital flows and investigate the dynamics of international investors 
response according to the type of government in power. This paper investigates both the 
fiscal outcomes and political factors that influence the level of international capital 
flows. 
The analysis over the dynamics of fiscal policy on level of international flows illustrates 
some common elements, but several dimensions of heterogeneity between the three 
types of capital flows. 
With regard to the two questions raised in the introduction, the empirical findings 
produce the following answers:  
1) Do the fiscal policy outcome affect the allocation of international capital flows?  
The empirical findings indicate that, under fixed effects regression, government 
expenses are a statistical significant determinant of the three types of capital flows, 
although the impacts are different according to the type of flow. Foreign direct 
investment has a positive relationship with government expenses - if governments 
increase their expenditures, FDI will increase in level terms.  The impact on capital 
account and equity flows is negative, which means that an increase in government 
expenditures decrease the level of capital account flows and equity flows. Government 
revenues results are not statistical significant for any type of capital flow. 
2) How do international investors respond to the same fiscal policy undertaken by 
different actors? 
20 
 
The results shows that, government expenses are positively related and revenues 
negatively related with the level of FDI. Meaning that, when a government increase 
their expenses or decrease their revenues, FDI net flows tend to increase, but with 
different results for the different cabinet system. 
In case of a Center government the results are significant and positive correlated, but the 
effects of a Right or Left wing cabinet are not significant. Majority and Coalition 
governments expenditure are also statistical significant and an increase in expenditures 
increase the level of FDI. Concerning government revenues, the tests shows that a 
Center government increase in revenues have a negative impact, but no impact for a 
Right or Left wing government increase in revenues. Majority and Coalition 
government increase in revenues have a negative impact on level terms for FDI. 
Regarding capital account, an increase in expenditures by a Left government is 
negatively related and an increase in expenditures by a Majority government is 
positively related.  
Right and Left wing governments have a negative impact on equity flows by an increase 
in government expenditures and a positive impact with an increase in revenues. 
Moreover, majorities tend to prejudice the level of the three types of flows, and Right 
and Left wing governments attract, on average, more capital account and equity flows 
than Center governments. GDP per capita is a significant determinant of the level of the 
three type of capital flows, and more developed countries have, on average, lower level 
of capital flows. Moreover, real per capita GDP growth is also a significant 
determinants of equity flows, with a positive correlation, meaning that a country with an 
higher growth rate, receives, on average, more equity flows. 
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Appendix A.1 - Foreign Direct Investment 1960 - 2008 
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Appendix A.2 - Capital Account 1960 - 2008  
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Appendix B - Variable description 
International capital flows 
FDI net (p.p.) 
Foreign direct investment is net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management 
interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy 
other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, 
other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. 
This series shows total net FDI in the reporting economy from foreign sources less net 
FDI by the reporting economy to other economies. Data are in GDP percentage points. 
Capital account 
(p.p.) 
Net capital account includes government debt forgiveness, investment grants in cash or 
in kind by a government entity, and taxes on capital transfers. Also included are 
migrants' capital transfers and debt forgiveness and investment grants by 
nongovernmental entities. Data is in GDP percentage points. 
Equity in (p.p.) 
Portfolio equity includes net inflows from equity securities other than those recorded as 
direct investment and including shares, stocks, depository receipts (American or 
global), and direct purchases of shares in local stock markets by foreign investors. Data 
is in GDP percentage points. 
Controls 
Real per capita 
GDP growth (p.p.) 
Annual growth of the gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is 
the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Data is in percentage points. 
Inflation CPI (p.p.) 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage 
change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services 
that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres 
formula is generally used. Data is in percentage points. 
GDP per capita 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Data is in thousands of U.S. dollars. 
Political 
Left_mode 
Dummy variable identifying country/year pairs in which the cabinet ideology most days 
“in office” is left, in a given country/year observation. 
Center_mode 
Dummy variable identifying country/year pairs in which the cabinet ideology most days 
“in office” is center, in a given country/year observation. 
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Right_mode 
Dummy variable identifying country/year pairs in which the cabinet ideology most days 
“in office” is right, in a given country/year observation. 
Majority_mode 
Dummy variable identifying country/year pairs in which the cabinet parliamentary most 
days “in office” is majority, in a given country/year observation. 
Coalition_mode 
Dummy variable identifying country/year pairs in which the cabinet quantitative party 
composition most days “in office” is coalition, in a given country/year observation. 
Fiscal Variables 
Total 
disbursements 
Net lending is the net amount a unit or a sector has available to finance, directly or 
indirectly, other units or other sectors. Government net lending is general government 
current tax and non-tax receipts less general government total outlays 
Total outlays 
The figures for total outlays consist of current outlays plus capital outlays. Current 
outlays are the sum of current consumption, transfer payments, subsidies and property 
income paid (including interest payments). Data refer to the general government sector, 
which is a consolidation of accounts for the central, state and local government plus 
social security. 
Government net 
lending 
Tax receipts of the government sector are defined as the sum of direct taxes on 
household and business sectors, indirect taxes and social security contributions. Non-
tax receipts include operating surpluses, property income, user charges and fees, other 
current and capital transfers received by the general government. Data refer to the 
general government sector, which is a consolidation of accounts for the central, state 
and local government plus social security. 
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Appendix C.1 - Summary Statistics (1960-2008) 
International Capital flows 
Variable name Observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
FDI net (p.p.) 798 -0.33 3.2 -24.47 29.75 
Capital account 
(p.p.) 
804 0.09 0.45 -2.58 2.46 
Equity in (p.p.) 789 1.6 7.25 -12.85 75.83 
Real per capita 
GDP growth 
(p.p.) 
1050 2.45 2.75 -8.45 13.27 
Inflation CPI 
(p.p.) 
1045 6.02 6.8 -4.48 84.22 
GDP per capita 1085 15.94 14.35 0.36 94.57 
Time in government 
Variable name Observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Left 1038 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Right 1038 0.57 0.5 0 1 
Center 1038 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Minority 1038 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Majority 1038 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Single Party 1038 0.45 0.5 0 1 
Coalition 1038 0.55 0.5 0 1 
Fiscal Variables 
Variable name Observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Expenditure 902 42.79 9.64 18.17 70.93 
Revenue 902 40.78 9.37 20.2 63.47 
Budget Deficit 923 -1.97 4.35 -16.01 18.77 
Expenditures 
Variable name Observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Right 475 41.04 9.73 18.17 70.92 
Left 226 45.69 7.59 26.76 65.3 
Center 178 44.81 8.72 28.44 64.6 
Minority 256 44.32 9.70 22.25 70.93 
Majority  624 42.44 9.03 18.17 64.6 
Single Party 416 40.88 8.94 18.17 65.3 
Coalition 464 44.87 9.15 22.42 70.93 
Revenues 
Variable name Observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Right 475 38.48 8.92 20.2 60.92 
Left 226 44.76 8.36 25.16 63.47 
Center 178 43.62 7.97 27.72 56.93 
Minority 256 43.54 10.26 23.37 63.47 
Majority  624 40.13 8.35 20.2 59.07 
Single Party 416 38.72 9.06 20.2 63.47 
Coalition 464 43.27 8.54 22.37 60.92 
Budget Deficit 
Variable name Observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Right 489 -2.51 4.15 -14.52 15.09 
Left 233 -0.88 4.67 -12.14 18.77 
Center 178 -1.2 4 -16.01 7.82 
Minority 262 -0.78 4.61 -14.03 15.37 
Majority  639 -2.27 4.12 -16.01 18.77 
Single Party 437 -2.08 3.86 -14.03 15.37 
Coalition 464 -1.6 4.7 -16.09 18.77 
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Appendix C.2 - Summary Statistics (1998-2008) 
International Capital flows 
Variable name Observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
FDI net (p.p.) 258 -1.06 5.23 -24.47 29.75 
Capital account 
(p.p.) 
258 0.11 0.65 -2.58 2.01 
Equity in (p.p.) 259 3.86 12.01 -12.85 75.83 
Real per capita 
GDP growth 
(p.p.) 
261 1.5 2.51 -8.45 9.41 
Inflation CPI 
(p.p.) 
264 2.2 1.65 -4.48 12.67 
GDP per capita 264 33.8 13.11 11.44 94.57 
Time in government 
Variable name Observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Left 242 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Right 242 0.53 0.5 0 1 
Center 242 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Minority 242 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Majority 242 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Single Party 242 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Coalition 242 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Fiscal Variables 
Variable name Observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Expenditure 264 44.52 6.7 31.33 61.18 
Revenue 264 43.9 7.56 30.33 62.86 
Budget Deficit 264 -0.63 4.65 -15.66 18.77 
Expenditures 
Variable name Observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Right 128 42.11 6.57 31.33 54.7 
Left 74 45.81 6.2 34.35 61.2 
Center 40 47.63 4.92 33.88 57.82 
Minority 67 44.8 7.7 31.33 61.2 
Majority  175 43.91 6.11 32.02 57.82 
Single Party 81 42.98 6.05 33.88 61.18 
Coalition 161 44.75 6.78 31.33 57.82 
Revenues 
Variable name Observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Right 128 41.44 7.5 30.53 57.5 
Left 74 46.17 7.2 35.3 62.86 
Center 40 48.16 4.96 34.88 55.2 
Minority 67 46.71 8.91 31.40 62.86 
Majority  175 42.96 6.71 30.53 59.07 
Single Party 81 41.7 7.28 31.30 62.86 
Coalition 161 45.15 7.45 30.53 59.07 
Budget Deficit 
Variable name Observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Right 128 -0.67 3.84 -11.2 15.09 
Left 74 0.36 5.31 -6.05 18.77 
Center 40 0.54 3.26 -13.56 6.9 
Minority 67 1.92 4.32 -7.64 15.37 
Majority  175 -0.95 4 -13.56 18.77 
Single Party 81 -1.28 3.85 -11.16 15.37 
Coalition 161 0.41 4.39 -13.56 18.77 
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